DEAR PROCON.ORG READERS: We’re being outspent by biased organizations that use millions of dollars to misinform you. This week we’re asking our readers to help us. We survive on donations, which keep us independent and ad-free. If every one of our readers gave $3 now, the price of a cup of coffee, our fundraiser would be over. We’re a small nonprofit, but it costs a lot to keep our servers, research staff, and programs going. ProCon.org is your oasis on the Internet for unbiased information on important issues. If ProCon.org is useful to you, please take a minute to keep us online and ad-free. Thank you.
Ian J. Bickerton, PhD, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern and United States History at the University of New South Wales-Australia, and Carla L. Klausner, PhD, Professor of Modern Middle East, Medieval Europe and Judaic Studies at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, in their 2002 fourth edition of the book A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, described an important outcome as follows:
"For the Palestinians, the Reagan Plan was unacceptable. The Israelis rejected the initiative out of hand.
In September 1982, at an Arab summit held in Fez, Morocco, Arab leaders responded [to the Reagan Plan] with their own -- the Fez -- plan. The main provisions of the Fez plan called for the complete withdrawal by Israel from all territories occupied in 1967, including east Jerusalem, the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and a Palestinian state under PLO leadership. In an effort to return to the arena as a major player, on September 15, the Soviets came up with their own -- the Brezhnev -- peace plan, which essentially mirrored the Fez plan, although it did make specific reference to the future security of Israel, something the Fez plan failed to mention. The Israelis rejected these initiatives as well."
Ami Isseroff, DSc, Director of the MidEastWeb for Coexistence, in a 2006 article entitled "Reagan Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plan of 1982, Introduction," wrote:
this plan envisioned a settlement in the framework of Jordanian control
of the West Bank and Gaza, in other respects it anticipated the Oslo
Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo
in that it called for Palestinian autonomy and a five year transition
period. Though the US tried to get Arab support for the plan, the
Saudis put forth their own plan, which was modified and adopted as the
Fez Initiative at the twelfth Arab summit in December of 1982. It did
not call for recognition of Israel, unlike Reagan's plan, and it did
call for recognition of Palestinian rights and for an independent
Barry Rubin, PhD, Director of the Global Research for International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, in a chapter entitled "The United States and The Middle East, 1984-1985" from the 1987 book Middle East Contemporary Survey, pointed to a shift in American policy towards the Middle East:
the Reagan Administration tried to make use of the conclusions it had
drawn about Middle East policy during its first term in office. The
framework for its diplomatic activism had been laid down in the
September 1982 Reagan Plan, and to this, were now added calculations
about the difficulty of mediating an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, a
recognition of the need to await decisive initiatives from the Arab
side, and a higher priority on counter-terrorist actions... in
constrast [to 1982], there were also experiments with new political
alignments, including American diplomatic efforts to take advantage of
the apparently emerging bloc of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, as well as an
attempted coordination between Jordan and the PLO."