Ian J. Bickerton, PhD, Professor of Middle Eastern History at the University of New South Wales, and Carla L. Klausner, PhD, Professor of the Modern Middle East at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, in their 2002 book A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, wrote:
"The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, known variously as the Interim agreement, or Oslo II, or the Taba accord, was the second phase of the process that had begun with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho in May 1994, and it set the stage for the final status talks to begin by May 1996.
The agreement established three areas in the West Bank: Area A, which would consist of territory to be placed under direct Palestinian control; Area B, jointly-controlled territory, in which the Palestinians would exercise civil and police authority but Israel would retain security responsibility; and Area C, territory in which Israel would have exclusive control.
Accordingly the agreement provided for the Israel Defense Forces to redeploy from the major cities of Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Nablus, Bethleham, Ramallah (to be included in Area A), and from about 450 Palestinian villages and smaller communities (to be included in Area B).
Areas A and B, consisting of approximately 3 percent and 24 percent respectively of the West Bank, contained the majority of the Palestinian population. Area C consisted of sparsely or unpopulated areas, Israeli military installations and Jewish settlements.
After the Israeli withdrawal from the populated areas, elections would be held for a Palestinian legislative council and the head of the council. In Hebron, the army would redeploy, but special security arrangements would apply. Further redeployments from parts of Area C should occur in three Phases at six-month intervals and be completed within eighteen months from the inauguration of the Council. Other provisions concerned prisoner releases, the allocation of water resources, and a commitment by the PLO to amend its covenant within two months after the inauguration of the Palestine Council."
Ghassan Khatib, MA, Palestinian Authority Minister of Planning, in a 1995 essay titled "The Inadequacy of an Interim Agreement," from the Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, wrote:
"The aim for an interim stage was
threefold: First, it was a confidence building measure, providing a
joint and common language to pave the way to success in the real and
difficult negotiations - those of the final settlement. Second, it
aimed to convince each side of the good intentions of the other.
Finally, it set out to better the economic conditions of the
Palestinians, providing proof of the advantages of peace, and to
improve the security of the Israelis for the same purpose."