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Ian J. Bickerton, PhD, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern and US History at the University of New South Wales, and Carla L. Klausner, PhD, Professor of Modern Middle East, Medieval Europe, and Judaic Studies at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, wrote the following in their 2002 book A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
"The Sharm al-Sheikh agreement [signed by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat on October 4, 1999] set out a timetable for a permanent peace settlement. A declaration of principles on final status issues was to be reached by February 13, 2000 and a permanent settlement reached by September 13, 2000. Israel accepted the remaining 11 percent redeployment agreed upon at Wye [October 3, 1998], and Arafat compromised by accepting the release of 350 prisoners, rather than the 400 the Palestinians had requested."
Benny Morris, PhD, Professor of History at Ben-Gurion University, in his 2001 book Righteous Victims, wrote:
"After the promised prisoner releases and after the Israeli implementation of the first stage of the Sharm ash Sheikh-provisioned withdrawal, arguments errupted over how much and which territory was to be handed over to the Palestinians in the second stage (scheduled for November). Moreover, time was wasted in several unfruitful rounds of preliminary final status talks, and Palestinian terrorist attacks inside Israel caused further delays and bad blood. In December, the Palestinians suspended the negotiations citing Israel's continued expansion of West Bank settlements. The Israeli and Palestinian negotiators failed to reach a draft or 'framework' final peace accord by February 13, 2000, as Barak had wanted."